Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness

A special double issue of Journal of Consciousness Studies
edited by Keith Frankish

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23, No. 11–12
Publication date: December 2016
Journal webpage the for issue.

If you wish buy the issue, please contact Sandra Good at Imprint Academic (sandra@imprint.co.uk), giving the volume and issue number (i.e. 23/11-12).

Contents

Editorial introduction [download pdf]
Keith Frankish, Illusionism as a theory of consciousness (target article)
Katalin Balog, Illusionism’s discontent
Sue Blackmore, Delusions of consciousness
Daniel Dennett, Illusionism as the obvious default theory of consciousness
Jay Garfield, Illusionism and givenness
Philip Goff, Is realism about consciousness compatible with a scientifically respectable world view?
Michael Graziano, Consciousness engineered
Nicholas Humphrey, Redder than red: Illusionism or phenomenal surrealism?
François Kammerer, The hardest aspect of the illusion problem – and how to solve it
Pete Mandik, Meta-illusionism and qualia quietism
Nicole L. Marinsek and Michael S. Gazzaniga, A split-brain perspective on illusionism
Martine Nida-Rumelin, The illusion of illusionism
Derk Pereboom, Illusionism and anti-functionalism about phenomenal consciousness
Jesse Prinz, Against illusionism
Georges Rey, Taking consciousness seriously — as an illusion!
Amber Ross, Illusionism and the epistemological problems facing phenomenal realism
Eric Schwitzgebel, Phenomenal consciousness, defined and defended as innocently as I can manage
James Tartaglia, What is at stake in illusionism?
Keith Frankish, Not disillusioned: Reply to commentators

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