This section sets out my main philosophical positions. The focus is on substantive philosophical content—what I think about consciousness, belief, reasoning, and the architecture of the mind.
The topics below are not discrete subjects but overlapping aspects of a unified body of work. My account of consciousness connects to my views on belief, which in turn relate to dual-process theories, language, and self-knowledge. I’ve organized the material this way because different topics serve as entry points for different audiences and research interests.
How the Magic Works
How the Magic Works is my philosophical blog—informal, exploratory writing on consciousness, illusionism, and related topics. It’s thinking in progress, cross-published on Substack.
Topic pages
Illusionism
Why phenomenal consciousness is an illusion. I argue that phenomenal properties—the irreducibly subjective qualities of experience—don’t really exist but are introspective illusions created by our cognitive systems.
The two-level mind
The architecture of the human mind. I distinguish the basic mind (non-conscious, passive, generating partial beliefs) from the supermind (conscious, active, constructed through language-involving premising policies). This framework explains akrasia, self-deception, and first-person authority.
Belief and acceptance
The nature of belief states. I distinguish partial beliefs from flat-out beliefs, arguing that flat-out beliefs are premising policies. I also distinguish genuine beliefs from acceptances—commitments adopted for pragmatic rather than epistemic reasons.
Dual-process theories
Two systems, two minds? Psychologists distinguish System 1 and System 2 reasoning. I offer a philosophical reinterpretation: System 1 is basic reasoning at the subpersonal level, System 2 is supermental reasoning at the personal level.
Language and thought
The cognitive role of language. I argue that natural language is not merely for communication but serves as the vehicle for conscious, explicit reasoning. It enables the construction of the supermind and the formation of superbeliefs.
Self-knowledge
How well do we know our own minds? I argue that introspection is systematically misleading and that we have performative authority over explicit attitudes but only interpretive access to implicit ones. This challenges the Cartesian picture of transparent self-knowledge.
Artificial intelligence
Can machines be conscious? What would it take for AI to have genuine understanding? I explore questions about machine consciousness, the possibility of artificial phenomenology, and the implications of illusionism for AI.
