Publications by date


The rationale of rationalization (with Walter Veit, Joe Dewhurst, Krzysztof Dołęga, Max Jones, Shaun Stanley, and Daniel C. Dennett) Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43. 2020.

The demystification of consciousness. Issue 86, 20th March 2020.

The lure of the Cartesian sideshow. The Philosophers’ Magazine, 88, 1st Quarter 2020 (‘Problems in Mind’): 69-74.


The meta-problem is the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 26(9-10):83-94.


Death is no leveller if some live much longer than others. Aeon, December 2018.

What is it like to be a bot? (short story) Philosophy Now Issue 126: June/July 2018, pp.56-8 (Philosophy Now website version). Postscript on the philosophical background to the story.

Inner speech and outer thought. In P. Langland-Hassan and A. Vicente (eds.), Inner Speech: New Voices, Oxford University Press, 2018.
Show abstract

The best books on philosophy of mind. Five Books, February 2018.

AI and consciousness. Interalia Magazine, Issue 39, February 2018.

What do you really believe? Take the Truth-Demon Test. Aeon, January 2018.


Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness (ed.). Exeter: Imprint Academic.

How to read a mind. iai News, Issue 57: Knowing Others and Knowing Our Selves, August 2017.

The blind Bach-maker (review of From Bacteria to Bach and Back by Daniel C. Dennett). The Economist, March 11th 2017, pp.87-8. (Online version, titled ‘How humans became intelligent’.)


Illusionism as a theory of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11-12) (2016). (Target article for special issue on illusionism.) Show abstract

Not disillusioned: Reply to commentators. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11-12) (2016). Show abstract

Why panpsychism fails to solve the mystery of consciousness. Aeon, September 2016.
–Reprinted in The Atlantic, under the title ‘Why panpsychism is probably wrong’

The mind isn’t locked in the brain but extends far beyond it. Aeon, July 2016.

Whatever you think, you don’t necessarily know your own mind. Aeon, May 2016.

Belief, willpower, and implicit bias. The Brains Blog, 12 April, 2016

Foreword: Cooking eggs on a toaster. In L. Macchi, M. Bagassi, and R. Viale (eds), The Cognitive Unconscious and Human Rationality (pp. vii-x). MIT Press, 2016.

Playing double: Implicit bias, dual levels, and self-control. In M. Brownstein and J. Saul (eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy Volume I: Metaphysics and Epistemology (pp.23-46). Oxford University Press, 2016. Show abstract


Dennett’s dual-process theory of reasoning. In C. Muñoz-Suárez and F. De Brigard, F. (eds.) Content and Consciousness Revisited (pp. 73-92). Springer, 2015. Show abstract

Is great philosophy, by its nature, difficult and obscure? Aeon, November 2015

For a dual theory of belief. The Brains Blog/Minds Online, 14 September 2015.
— Invited commentary on Jack Marley-Payne, Against intellectualist theories of belief.

Consciousness is a life-transforming illusion. Aeon (commissioned ‘viewpoint’), June 2015

Double the uncertainty. The Brains Blog/Minds Online, 23 February 2015.
— Invited commentary on Aaron Norby, Uncertainty without all the doubt.


Review of Soul Dust: The Magic of Consciousness by Nicholas Humphrey. Philosophical Quarterly, 64(255): 338-40 (2014).

Introduction (with William M. Ramsey). In K. Frankish and W. M. Ramsey (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence (pp. 1-11). Cambridge University Press.

The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence (ed. with William M. Ramsey). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Are delusions acceptances? Imperfect Cognitions blog, June 2014.

Аргумент антизомбі Ukrainian translation of my ‘The anti-zombie argument’ (2007) by Ulyana Lushch in Andriy Synytsya (ed.) Антологія сучасної аналітичної філософії, або жук залишає коробку (Anthology of Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, or Beetle Leaves a Box), pp.337-62, L’viv: Litopys, 2014.


Regenerating the Doctor. OpenLearn, November 2013.

A Greek perspective on austerity psychology (with Maria Kasmirli). The Psychologist, September 2013.


Dual systems and dual attitudes. Mind & Society, 11(1): 41-51 (2012), doi: 10.1007/s11299-011-0094-5. Show abstract

A diet, but not the qualia plan. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(2): 679-80 (2012). Show abstract

Quining diet qualia. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(2): 667-76 (2012), doi:10.1016/j.concog.2011.04.001 Show abstract

Delusions, levels of belief, and non-doxastic acceptances. Neuroethics, 5(1): 23-7 (2012), doi: 10.1007/s12152-011-9123-7. Show abstract

Introduction (with William M. Ramsey). In K. Frankish and W. M. Ramsey (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science (pp. 1-6). Cambridge University Press, 2012.

The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science (ed. with William M. Ramsey). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.


Cognitive capacities, mental modules, and neural regions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18(4): 279-82, doi: 10.1353/ppp.2011.0052. Show abstract

Reasoning, argumentation, and cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(2): 79-80, doi: 10.1017/S0140525X10002979. Show abstract

Conscious thinking, acceptance, and self-deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(1): 20-1, doi: 10.1017/S0140525X10002554. Show abstract

Introduction (with Jesús Aguilar and Andrei Buckareff). In J. H. Aguilar, A. A Buckareff, and K. Frankish (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Action (pp. 1-9). Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.


Dual-process and dual-system theories of reasoning. Philosophy Compass, 5(10): 914-26, doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00330.x. Show abstract

Scalar implicature: Inference, convention, and dual processes (with Maria Kasmirli). In K. Manktelow, D. Over & S. Elqayam (eds), The Science of Reason: A Festschrift for Jonathan St. B. T. Evans (pp. 259-81). Psychology Press. Show abstract

Evolving the linguistic mind. Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations, 9: 206-14. Show abstract

New Waves in Philosophy of Action (ed. with Jesús Aguilar and Andrei Buckareff). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.


Adaptive misbelief or judicious pragmatic acceptance? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32(6): 520-1, doi: 10.1017/S0140525X0999121X. Show abstract

Delusions: A two-level framework. In M. Broome and L. Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives (pp. 269-84). Oxford University Press. Show abstract

Mind and consciousness (with Maria Kasmirli). In J. Shand (ed.), The Central Issues of Philosophy, (pp. 107-20). Blackwell.

The duality of mind: An historical perspective. With Jonathan Evans. In J. Evans and K. Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond (pp.1-29). Oxford University Press. Show abstract

Systems and levels: Dual-system theories and the personal-subpersonal distinction. In J. Evans and K. Frankish (eds), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond, (pp.89-107). Oxford University Press. Show abstract

In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond (ed. with Jonathan Evans). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Partial belief and flat-out belief. In F. Huber and C. Schmidt-Petri (eds), Degrees of Belief (pp.75-93). Springer. Show abstract

How we know our conscious minds: Introspective access to conscious thoughts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32(2): 145-6, doi: 10.1017/S0140525X09000636. Copyright Cambridge University Press. Online edition of the journal at Cambridge Journals Online. Show abstract

Review of The Architecture of the Mind by Peter Carruthers. Philosophical Quarterly, 59(235): 371-5.


The anti-zombie argument. Philosophical Quarterly, 57(229): 650-66, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.510.x. The definitive version is available from the publisher’s website. Show abstract

Deciding to believe again. Mind. 116(463): 523-48, doi: 10.1093/mind/fzm523. Show abstract

Review of Mind by Eric Matthews. Philosophical Books, 48(2): 185-7.


Review of Consciousness in Action by Susan Hurley. Mind, 115(457): 156-9.

Non-monotonic inference. In: K. Brown (Editor-in-Chief), Encyclopedia of Language & Linguistics, Second Edition, Volume 8 (pp. 672-5). Elsevier.


Consciousness. Milton Keynes: The Open University.


Mind and Supermind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


Language, consciousness, and cross-modular thought. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25(6): 685-6. Show abstract


Evolving the linguistic mind. In J-L. Dessalles & L. Ghadakpour (eds.), Proceedings of the 3rd International Evolution of Language Conference (pp.104-108). Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Télécommunications.


A matter of opinion. Philosophical Psychology, 11(4): 423-42. Show abstract

Natural language and virtual belief. In P. Carruthers & J. Boucher (eds), Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes (pp.248-69). Cambridge University Press. Show abstract


Review of Kinds of Minds by D.C.Dennett (with T.E. Dickins). British Psychological Society, History and Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter, 24: 36-40.


How should we revise the paratactic theory? Analysis, 56(4): 251-63. Show abstract